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On March 7, 2017, 42-year-old Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police Constable 
Richer Dubuc died as a result of injuries 
sustained in a motor vehicle crash the 
previous day in Saint-Bernard-de-Lacolle, 
Quebec. He had been responding to a 
call when his patrol car collided with a 
tractor that was driving on the highway. 
Constable Dubuc was transported to a 
hospital where he succumbed to his 
injuries.
Constable Dubuc had served with the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police for 
seven years and was assigned to the 
Integrated Border Enforcement Team. He 
is survived by his wife and four children.
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IN MEMORIAM
Source: Officer Down Memorial Page available at www.odmp.org/canada
“They are our heroes. We shall not forget them.” 
inscription, Canadian Police And Peace Officer's Memorial
“As a police officer, 
his greatest ability 
was how he was 
able to relate to 
everyone he 
encountered.”
RCMP Superintendent
Paul Beauchesne
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Highlights In This Issue
Supreme Court Quicker In Deciding Cases 4
Officer Entitled To Infer Trafficking On Totality Of 
Circumstances
7
Officer Deciding Arrest Must Have Reasonable Grounds 9
‘Exigent Circumstances’ More Than Convenience, 
Propitiousness or Economy
13
Adult Correctional Statistics 19
Routine Safety Search Results In Exclusion Of Evidence 21
Cellphone Searches Incident To Arrest:  A Review 22
No Authority To Enter Home To See If Parents Good or 
Bad
24
Racial Profiling Can Be Inferred From Circumstances 27
“In Service: 10-8” Sign-up Now 30
Policing Across Canada: Facts & Figures 32
Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by 
Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
herein are provided for information purposes only 
and are not to be construed as legal or other 
professional advice. The opinions expressed herein 
are not necessarily  the opinions of the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to this 
newsletter.   
Upcoming Courses
Advanced Police Training
Advanced training provides opportunities for skill 
development and career enhancement for police 
officers. Training is offered in the areas of 
investigation, patrol operations and leadership for 
in-service municipal and RCMP police officers.
JIBC Police Academy
See Course List here.
Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal Analysis
www.jibc.ca
NEW JIBC Graduate 
Certificate in Public 
Safety Leadership
see 
pages  
39-40
Note-able Quote
“It was not the mountain that we 
conquered, it was ourselves.” 
- Sir Edmund Hillary
Canadian Police & 
Peace Officers’ 
40th Annual Memorial Service
September 24, 2017
Parliament Hill
Ottawa, Ontario
see 
page  
31
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Blindspot: hidden biases of good people.
Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald.
New York, NY: Delacorte Press, 2013.
BF 575 P9 B25 2013
The confidence game: why we fall for it ... every 
time.
Maria Konnikova.
New York, NY: Viking, 2016.
HV 6691 K66 2016
Digital copyright law.
Cameron Hutchison.
Toronto, ON: Irwin Law, 2016.
KE 2799 H88 2016
The end of average: how we succeed in a world 
that values sameness.
Todd Rose.
Toronto, ON: HarperCollins, 2016.
BF 637 S8 R67 2016
Face recognition: the effects of race, gender, age 
and species.
Edited by James Tanaka.
Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015.
BF 242 T36 2015
Kirkpatrick's four levels of training evaluation.
James D. Kirkpatrick & Wendy Kayser Kirkpatrick.
Alexandria, VA: ATD Press, 2016.
HF 5549.5 T7 K57 2016
The multicultural mind: unleashing the hidden 
force for innovation in your organization.
David C. Thomas.
Oakland, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, a  BK 
Business book, 2016.
HF 5549.5 M5 T46 2016
Never split the difference: negotiating as if your 
life depended on it.
Chris Voss with Tahl Raz.
London, UK: RH Business Books, 2016.
BF 637 N4 V67 2016
Psychiatry made ridiculously simple.
By Jefferson E. Nelson, William V. Good, Michael S. 
Ascher; art by Don P. Bridge.
Miami, FL: MedMaster, Inc., 2016.
RC 454 N45 2016
Rapid instructional design: learning ID fast and 
right.
George M. Piskurich.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2015. 
LB 1028.38 P57 2015
The skilled facilitator: a comprehensive resource 
for consultants, facilitators, managers, trainers, 
and coaches.
Roger M. Schwarz.
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2017.
HD 30.3 S373 2017
Stragility: excelling at strategic changes.
Ellen R. Auster & Lisa Hillenbrand.
Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2016.
HD 58.8 A899 2016
That's not how we do it here!: a story about how 
organizations rise, fall--and can rise again.
John Kotter & Holger Rathgeber.
New York, NY: Portfolio/Penguin, [2016]
HD 58.8 K673 2016
Violent no more: helping men end domestic 
abuse.
Michael Paymar; foreword by Anne Ganley.
Nashville, TN: Hunter House Incorporated, 2015.
RC 569.5 F3 P38 2015
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SUPREME COURT QUICKER IN 
DECIDING CASES
In its report, “Supreme Court of 
Canada - Statistics 2006 to 2016”, 
the workload of Canada’s highest 
Court was outlined. In 2016 the 
Supreme Court heard 63 appeals. 
This was the same number as it 
heard in 2015. The most appeals 
heard annually in the last 10 years 
was in 2008 when 82 cases were 
brought before the Court. The lowest number of 
appeals heard in a single year during the  last decade 
was 53 in 2007.
Case Life Span 
The time it takes for the Court to render a judgment 
from the date it hears a case was 4.8 months, down 
one month from 2015. The shortest time within the 
last 10 years for the Court to announce its decision 
after hearing arguments was 4.1 months (2014) 
while the longest time was 7.7 months (2010). 
Overall it took 16.3 months, on average, for the 
Court to render an opinion from the time an 
application for leave to hear a case  was filed. This is 
down from the previous year’s statistics when it took 
17.2 months. 
Applications for Leave 
In 2016 there were 598 applications for leave, 
meaning a party sought permission to appeal the 
decision of a lower court. Ontario was the source of 
most applications for leave at 175 cases. This was 
followed by Quebec (134), the Federal Court of 
Appeal (97), British Columbia (76), Alberta  (45), 
Saskatchewan (20), Manitoba (16), New Brunswick 
and Nova Scotia at 13 each, Newfoundland and 
Labrador (4), the Yukon (3), and Prince Edward 
Island and Nunavut each with one (1). No 
applications for leave came from the Northwest 
Territories. Of the  598 leave applications, 48 or 8% 
were granted while 84 were pending. Of all 
applications for leave, 25% were criminal and 75% 
were civil.
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Appeals Heard 
Of the 63 appeals heard in 2016, British Columbia 
had the most of any province at 17. This was 
followed by  Alberta with 15, Quebec (12), the 
Federal Court of Appeal (8) and Ontario (6). New 
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, 
and Newfoundland and Labrador each had one 
appeal heard. No appeals originated from the Yukon, 
Northwest Territories, Prince Edward Island or 
Nunavut. 
Of the appeals heard in 2016, 
5 9 % w e r e c iv i l wh i l e t h e 
remaining 41% were criminal. 
Eighteen percent (18%) of the 
criminal cases dealt with Charter 
issues. 
Fifteen (15) of the appeals heard in 2016 were as of 
right. This source  of appeal includes cases where 
there  was a dissent on a point of law in a provincial 
court of appeal. The remaining 48 cases had leave to 
appeal granted. 
Appeal Judgments 
There were 57 appeal judgments released in 2016, 
down from 74 the previous year. Thirteen (13) 
decisions were delivered from the bench last year 
while the  remaining 44 were  delivered after being 
reserved. Twenty-nine (29) appeals were allowed 
while 28 were dismissed. In terms of unanimity, the 
Supreme Court agreed on 61% of its cases. This is 
down from 70% the previous 
year. For the remaining 39% 
of its judgments released in 
2016 the Court was split. This 
is the lowest percentage  of 
unanimity in the last 10 years.
Source: www.scc-csc.gc.ca
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CHARTER TURNS 35
The Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms 
became law on April 17, 
1982. That was 35 years 
ago. Since then, courts 
across Canada have 
interpreted and applied 
the Charter. In doing so, courts have told the 
government and its actors (including the police) the 
limits of their powers when the exercise of those 
powers intersect with individual rights. This is no 
easy task. And not everyone agrees on the  law. Just 
look at the statistics above showing that judges of 
Canada’s highest court did not agree in almost four 
out of ten cases they heard last year.
Equally, if not more, difficult is applying these 
interpretations and the rules that develop to ever 
changing facts. But that is exactly what the police 
must do. Often, the  police must take these 
constitutional notions and principles, such as the 
right to privacy protected in s. 8 of the Charter, and 
apply them to daily reality, with little time for 
reflection, second opinion or timeouts.  
It has been said that “Doctors bury their mistakes 
while lawyers send theirs to prison. Police officers do 
a little of both.” That is because police officers make 
decisions everyday where errors can be costly. If the 
police screw up, cases, careers and even lives can be 
at stake. That is why training and education is key. 
“In Service: 10-8” is now entering its 17th 
year of publication. We salute all of our 
readers and thank them for all that they do in 
protecting the public and maintaining law 
and order in this great nation we call 
Canada.
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA DECISIONS: SPLIT v. UNANIMOUS
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
61%70%79%68%72%75%75%63%76%62%
39%
30%
21%
32%
28%
25%25%
37%
24%
38%
Split Unanimous
Volume 17 Issue 2 - March/April 2017
PAGE 7
OFFICER ENTITLED TO INFER 
TRAFFICKING ON TOTALITY OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES
R. v. Alexander, 2017 ONCA 181
Police set up surveillance  at the home 
of a known drug user. As a result of 
this surveillance, the  police  observed a 
vehicle driven by the accused make 
three  stops at three different locations 
in a 15-minute period. At the first stop the known 
drug user was observed briefly getting into the 
passenger side of the vehicle and exiting it shortly 
thereafter. At the second stop, about a minute after 
the vehicle had arrived, the accused was observed 
leaving the front of the residence  of known drug 
users and re-entering the vehicle. At the third stop, 
a man got into the passenger side of the vehicle for 
a short period of time and then exited. After the 
third stop, the accused was pulled over by police 
and arrested. He had 17 individually wrapped 
baggies of crack  cocaine totalling 8.3 grams in his 
jacket pocket. Various amounts of money were also 
found on the accused as well as in his vehicle. He 
was charged with possessing crack cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused argued that his rights 
under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter had 
been breached based on his warrantless 
arrest and search. In his view, the 
evidence was inadmissible  under s. 24(2). The main 
issue was whether the police had reasonable and 
probable grounds on which to base their arrest and 
the legality of the subsequent searches of his person 
and vehicle.
The judge noted that the accused’s arrest required 
reasonable and probable grounds, nothing more. In 
this case, the road boss ordered the arrest. 
Therefore, he would need reasonable and probable 
grounds based on the totality of the circumstances. 
“Looking at the totality of these facts, I am satisfied 
that the officers had more than reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe that [the  accused] had 
committed the offence of trafficking in drugs and 
effected an arrest on that basis,” said the judge. “In 
view of the  rapidity  of the covert contacts made in 
this very short investigation, I am satisfied that the 
single most likely explanation for [the accused’s] 
series of interactions with others, none of which 
lasted very long but two of which were in the car in 
the front of the  vehicle part, is that these were drug 
transactions.” Since the arrest was lawful the police 
were authorized to search the accused and his 
vehicle as an incident to arrest. The accused was 
convicted of possessing cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking and he was sentenced to 18 months in 
prison less time served. 
MORE ABOUT THE STOPS
STOP 1 (5:17 pm): A silver Acura attended at a 
known drug user’s residence. The known drug user 
was seen enter the vehicle and stayed in it for about 
10 seconds.  A surveillance officer said he believed 
the driver of the Acura to be the accused, but did not 
clearly identify him until the second stop. The vehicle 
left the known drug users residence and was 
surveilled by police.
STOP 2 (5:19 pm):  The Acura attended another 
residence, also associated to drug users. Another 
surveillance officer identified the accused as the 
driver and lone occupant of the Acura. The accused 
was seen walking away for the front door of the 
residence towards his car which left about one 
minute later. 
STOP 3 (5:31 pm): Police followed the vehicle to a 
third residence arriving. The accused remained in the 
vehicle and a white male got into its passenger side 
and was in the vehicle for a very short time. The 
accused left the residence in his vehicle at 5:32 pm. 
ARREST (5:38 pm): The accused was pulled over 
and arrested.
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Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused maintained that 
his arrest was unlawful and, 
therefore, the items seized in 
the search should have been 
excluded under s. 24(2). He again argued that the 
police did not have the requisite grounds to arrest 
him because the grounds provided were not 
objectively reasonable. He submitted that the judge 
erred in finding that:
1. It was reasonable  for the arresting officer to 
have proceeded on the basis that the accused 
had been the driver of the vehicle at all three 
locations;
2. There was an interaction with the accused and 
another person at the second location; and
3. At the time of the arrest, the arresting officer 
had knowledge that the resident at the  second 
location was associated with drug activities.
The Court of Appeal, however, rejected the 
accused’s submission:
The trial judge was well aware of the gaps in 
the police officer’s observations of the 
[accused’s] activities. He did not err in his 
assessment of the evidence. When viewed as a 
whole, the evidence supports the inferences 
drawn by the officer with respect to these three 
alleged misapprehensions. [para. 10]
Furthermore, the t r ia l judge provided a 
comprehensive summary of the  surveillance 
conducted and articulated clear and cogent reasons 
for the  conclusion that, both objectively and 
subjectively, the arresting officer had reasonable 
and probable grounds to believe that the offence of 
trafficking was occurring.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.ca
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Alexander, [2014] O.J. No. 6655 (ONSC).
1st stop
5:17 pm
R. v. Alexander
Accused made 
three stops within a 
15 minute period.
2nd stop
5:19 pm
3rd stop
5:31 pm
Arrest
5:38 pm
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OFFICER DECIDING ARREST 
MUST HAVE REASONABLE 
GROUNDS
R. v. Quilop, 2017 ABCA 70
 
In March or April of 2011 the police 
received information from an 
anonymous informer that the 
accused was involved in cocaine 
trafficking. The informer provided no 
details, nor was there any evidence with respect to 
the credibility of the informer or whether the 
informer had provided reliable information in the 
past. Further, there was no evidence about the 
reliability of the information or whether the 
information was first-hand or hearsay. Nevertheless, 
the police placed the accused under surveillance. 
On April 11, 2011, the accused was seen entering 
the apartment of a suspected drug trafficker. The 
police then saw the accused walking outside the 
apartment building  and get into a Lexus. A minute 
later he got out of the Lexus and ran down the 
street to a nearby law office. There was no evidence 
of what occurred in the Lexus or even if anybody 
else was in the vehicle. 
On April 12, 2011, the accused and a female 
companion were observed exiting the apartment 
building of the suspected drug trafficker and then 
drove to a residential address where they parked. A 
man came out of the residence and entered the 
accused’s vehicle, exiting two minutes later with an 
object in his hand the size of a baseball. About an 
hour later the police observed the accused parking 
his vehicle near an apartment complex. He was 
seen entering the apartment building carrying a 4” 
by 2” pouch. Six minutes later he exited the 
apartment building with the pouch in his 
possession. 
The lead investigator decided that the accused 
should be arrested. He told his commanding officer 
who then directed the arrest be made. The accused 
was arrested in the parking lot of a  shopping centre. 
He was searched and about $10 in change and a 
cellphone were found on him. A search of his 
vehicle turned up three more cellphones, 271.2 
grams of cocaine, $3,500 in cash and baggies. 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
Police testified that it was their opinion 
that the two surveillance observations 
made on April 12 were of “behaviour 
consistent with drug trafficking”, while 
they conceded the April 11 surveillance 
observation was not consistent with drug 
trafficking.
The accused argued his arrest was arbitrary under s. 
9 of the Charter, and the resulting  search and 
seizure were unreasonable under s. 8, because the 
police did not have reasonable grounds to make 
the arrest. He sought the exclusion of evidence (the 
drugs, money and cellphones) under s. 24(2). In his 
view, the arresting officer was the person needing 
the necessary reasonable grounds to make the 
arrest and could not rely on the unknown 
information of other officer’s. And, he contended, 
even if additional information the arresting  officer 
was unaware of could be used as grounds, the 
grounds for arrest were still not objectively 
reasonable.
The judge found the arrest lawful. In his opinion, 
only  the lead investigator making the decision to 
arrest needed the necessary grounds to do so, both 
subjectively and objectively. “I find in the  case 
WHY THE POLICE SUSPECTED 
DRUG TRAFFICKING
The suspicion about the other person, associated 
with the accused, being a drug trafficker was based 
on anonymous tipster information provided in 2010. 
However, there was no evidence with respect to the 
reliability of this information nor the credibility of the 
informer, and there was no evidence that this other 
person was ever charged with trafficking in drugs or 
that he had been convicted in the past of trafficking in 
drugs. In fact, a Provincial Court Judge had recently 
denied a police request for a warrant to search the 
apartment of this other person. A database search 
only revealed that “years earlier” the accused had 
been in the same vehicle as this other person.
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against [the accused] that few if any of the 
individual factual elements would give rise to 
objectively justifiable grounds for his arrest,” said 
the judge. “Taken together cumulatively and 
viewed through the lens of a reasonable  person 
with [the investigating officer’s] experience, they 
do.” Since the arrest was lawful and not arbitrary, 
the police were entitled to search the accused’s 
vehicle as an incident to the  arrest and the resulting 
searches and seizures did not breach s. 8. And, 
even if there  were Charter  breaches, the  evidence 
was not inadmissible under s. 24(2). The accused 
was convicted of possessing cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking  and possessing proceeds of 
crime. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused challenged the 
trial judge’s finding that the 
police had the necessary 
reasonable grounds for arrest. 
In his view, the commanding officer directed the 
arrest (not the lead investigator) and therefore the 
commander needed the grounds to make it. As 
well, he submitted that the police lacked objective 
reasonable grounds for the arrest.
Which Officer Needs Reasonable Grounds?
Before  determining which officer must have 
reasonable grounds, the  Court of Appeal outlined 
the elements of a lawful arrest:
Section 495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code states 
that a peace officer may arrest without warrant 
a person, who, on reasonable grounds, he 
believes has committed or is about to commit 
an indictable offence (in this case, unlawfully 
possessing a controlled substance for the 
purposes of trafficking). [para. 3]
There are two fundamental requirements for a 
lawful arrest. The first requirement is fairly 
straightforward. The peace officer who arrests a 
person or the peace officer or who decides and 
directs than a person ought to be arrested must 
subjectively believe that the person to be 
arrested has committed or is about to commit 
an indictable offence. The second part of the 
test is not so straightforward. The grounds upon 
which the peace officer arrests the person must 
be objectively justifiable in the sense that a 
reasonable person in the position of the peace 
officer, with all of his or her training and 
experience, must also be able to come to the 
conclusion that there were reasonable grounds 
for the arrest or detention. …
The Criminal Code requirement that there be 
reasonable grounds for the peace officer’s belief 
that an offence has been or about to be 
committed is designed to protect the liberty of 
the subject from arbitrary arrest. But like all 
“reasonable person” tests, reasonable persons 
can disagree on what is reasonable. And 
although section 495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code 
provides that a peace officer may arrest a 
person whom he believes has committed or is 
about to commit an indictable offence, the 
peace officer’s belief is not determinative. The 
“There are two fundamental requirements for a lawful arrest. The first requirement is fairly 
straightforward. The peace officer who arrests a person or the peace officer or who 
decides and directs than a person ought to be arrested must subjectively believe that the 
person to be arrested has committed or is about to commit an indictable offence. The 
second part of the test is not so straightforward. The grounds upon which the peace 
officer arrests the person must be objectively justifiable in the sense that a reasonable 
person in the position of the peace officer, with all of his or her training and experience, 
must also be able to come to the conclusion that there were reasonable grounds for the 
arrest or detention.”
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grounds for the peace officer’s belief are 
accorded some deference; but in order for a 
determination to be made as to whether the 
citizen’s Charter right not to be arbitrarily 
detained has been infringed, the court’s 
function is to review the reasonableness of the 
peace officer’s belief when that belief is 
questioned. Appellate courts scrutinize not only 
the peace officer’s grounds for the arrest but 
also the lower court’s view of those grounds. 
[paras. 9-10]
In this case, the Crown conceded 
that the commanding officer did 
not have reasonable grounds to 
direct the arrest. Nevertheless, 
the Court of Appeal agreed with 
the trial judge that the lead 
investigator was the one actually 
deciding that the arrest should be made, even 
though the commanding officer could have vetoed 
the decision. “It is the peace officer who decides 
that an arrest be made who must have reasonable 
and probable grounds, even if that officer does not 
perform the actual arrest,” said the Court of Appeal. 
“The ability of the commanding officer to 
countermand that decision did not alter the fact 
that it was the lead investigator who made the 
decision to arrest.” The Appeal Court added:
[W]here the grounds for the arrest are based on 
the observations of many peace officers, the 
focus must be on the peace officer who made 
the decision to arrest. If prior to the arrest one 
or more of the peace officers involved in the 
surveillance had a properly grounded belief; 
and if the fact of that properly grounded belief 
was communicated to the peace officers who 
made the arrest, even if the particulars of the 
grounds were not communicated, the arrest 
was lawful. [para. 20]
Did Reasonable Grounds Exist?
In this case, the trial judge had 
found that few, if any, of the 
individual surveillance observations 
would give rise to objectively 
justifiable  grounds for the arrest. 
However,  when considered in their totality, the 
trial judge held that the arrest for cocaine 
possession for the purposes of trafficking was 
objectively reasonable. But the Court of Appeal 
disagreed with this analysis. 
The surveillance observations said to be consistent 
with drug offences were consistent with lawful 
behaviour and could not objectively suggest the 
accused had committed or was about to commit an 
indictable offence:
The surveillance information consisted of three 
observations over two days and only two of the 
observations were said by police to be 
consistent with illegal drug activity. The 
observations were of extremely short duration. 
They took place in a matter of minutes. Not 
much was observed. There was no evidence of 
the [accused] using a cellphone. There was no 
observation of a hand-to-hand exchange. There 
was no evidence that anything transpired in the 
residence or the vehicles the [accused] was 
observed to have entered and exited. 
Furthermore, there was nothing connecting the 
persons the [accused] met or the residence he 
visited to known drug dealers. And there was 
no evidence of evasive or counter-surveillance 
tactics by the [accused].
The Crown argued that it would be difficult to 
imagine an innocent explanation for what the 
police observed. We disagree. People buying 
and selling items online, from small collectibles 
to hockey tickets, for example, often conduct 
transactions in their homes or cars or on the 
street. And such transactions can be extremely 
brief where the parties have previously agreed 
on price or where the transaction is conditional 
upon a cursory inspection by the buyer. [paras. 
31-32]
“It is the peace officer who decides that 
an arrest be made who must have 
reasonable and probable grounds, even 
if that officer does not perform the 
actual arrest.” 
Volume 17 Issue 2 - March/April 2017
PAGE 12
“The police simply  suspected drug trafficking,” said 
the Court of Appeal. “Mere suspicion cannot justify 
an arrest”:
Only evidence which indicates the [accused] 
might be committing the indictable offence of 
possessing a controlled substance for the 
purposes of trafficking could ground a credible 
probability that the [accused] was committing 
or was about to commit the offence. Other 
evidence which provides context for the 
inculpatory evidence may be part of the so 
called constellation of facts which may indicate 
a credibly-based probability, but that other 
evidence, in and of itself, cannot form the basis 
for objectively justifiable grounds for arrest. It is 
correct, as the Crown argues, that a 
constellation of facts may indicate something 
completely different from the individual facts of 
which the constellation is comprised. And it is 
the entire constellation of facts which must be 
considered. But here that constellation did not 
indicate a credibly-based probability that an 
indictable offence had been committed.
The only evidence which directly supported a 
credibly-based probability that the [accused] 
was committing the offence was the hearsay 
evidence of the anonymous informant that the 
[accused] was dealing in drugs. That evidence, 
together with the evidence of behaviour which 
may have indicated some form of in-person 
commercial transactions (although even the 
commerciality of the observed encounters was 
not clear) might have formed the basis of 
credibly-based probability but for the fact that 
the informant evidence did not meet the test for 
relying on such evidence  … . The informant’s 
information amounted to no more than an 
assertion without any basis to assess its 
reliability. There were no details provided by 
the informant which might have been checked 
out o r cor robora ted by independent 
investigation. The fact that the informant’s 
information ultimately proved to be correct did 
not constitute corroboration. The corroboration 
which permits reliance on an anonymous 
informant’s evidence must be identified prior to 
arrest, not after. As previously indicated, no 
evidence was adduced with respect to 
reliability of the informant or the information 
which he or she provided in the past. Given the 
frailties of this informant’s information, the 
focus must be on what the police actually 
observed. [reference omitted, paras. 28-29]
Was the Vehicle Search Lawful?
Since the police lacked the necessary  reasonable 
grounds for the  accused’s arrest, his arrest was 
unlawful and therefore arbitrary under s. 9 of the 
Charter. As a consequence, the search of the 
vehicle was not a search incidental to a lawful 
arrest and breached s. 8. 
Was the Evidence Admissible? 
The Court of Appeal, contrary to the trial judge’s 
ruling, found the evidence to be inadmissible under 
s. 24(2). The seriousness of the state conduct and its 
impact on the Charter-protected interests of the 
accused did not offset the  public’s interest in a trial 
on the merits.    
The accused’s appeal was allowed, the evidence 
was excluded and acquittals to all charges were 
entered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Basanez & Quilop, 2014 ABQB 348.
“The police simply suspected drug 
trafficking. Mere suspicion cannot 
justify an arrest.”
BY THE BOOK:
Power of Arrest: Criminal Code
s. 495  (1)  A peace officer may arrest without 
warrant
(a)  a person who has committed an indictable 
offence or who, on reasonable grounds, he 
believes has committed or is about to commit an indictable 
offence;
(b) a person whom he finds committing a criminal offence;
[...]
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‘EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES’ 
MORE THAN CONVENIENCE, 
PROPITIOUSNESS or ECONOMY
R. v. Paterson, 2017 SCC 15
Police responded to a 911 call from a 
woman, crying and apparently 
injured. Authorities spoke to the 
caller’s mother who told police that 
she thought her daughter was with 
her boyfriend, the accused, who lived in a nearby 
apartment. The mother also said the accused 
possibly  had a shotgun. The police went to the 
apartment building and learned that the daughter 
had been transported by ambulance to the hospital 
with unknown injuries. The police attended the 
accused’s apartment, knocked several times and 
announced “police”. The door was eventually 
opened by the accused. 
As soon as the door opened, an officer smelled a 
fairly  strong odour of raw and smoked marihuana. 
Police questioned the accused about the 911 call 
and were satisfied that no one else needed 
assistance. When questioned about the marihuana 
smell, the accused denied its source but then 
admitted that he still had some “roaches” lying 
around. The police decided to seize the marihuana 
and “be on their way” without charging the 
accused with drug offences - a no case seizure. 
The accused agreed to hand over the “roaches” but 
attempted to close the door. An officer used his foot 
to prevent the door from closing. He feared that the 
accused would destroy  evidence and was 
concerned for officer safety (the possible shotgun). 
Police followed the accused into the residence. The 
accused picked up a baggie containing roaches on 
the kitchen counter to give to police. The officer 
then saw a bullet-proof vest on a  couch, a handgun 
on an end table  and a bag of pills on a speaker 
stand. The accused was immediately  arrested and 
searched. A Blackberry cellphone and $4,655 in 
cash were found on his person. The premises was 
“cleared” for officer safety purposes and two large 
bags of orange and blue pills (ecstasy), and a  bag of 
crack cocaine  was found on a closet shelf. The 
apartment was secured, the accused transported to 
the police station and a search warrant under the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) was 
obtained. When police attended the hospital, the 
injured woman said she slipped, hit the back of her 
head and called 911. When the search warrant was 
executed, three more handguns were found in a 
bedroom drawer as well as another bag of drugs in 
the kitchen. A Form 5.2 was filed by police several 
months after the seizure. The accused was 
subsequently charged with several offences.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The accused argued his rights under s. 8 
of the Charter had been violated and 
sought the exclusion of the evidence.  In 
his view, the warrantless entry into his 
residence breached s. 8 of the Charter  because 
there  were no exigent circumstances within the 
meaning of s. 11(7) of the CDSA making it 
impracticable for the police to obtain a warrant. As 
well, he suggested the late  filing of the Form 5.2 
was itself a s. 8 Charter breach. 
On the warrantless search issue, the judge 
disagreed. He concluded that the police were 
What the police found:
• Loaded Smith & Wesson 38 special revolver.
• Loaded Ruger P85 9 mm semi-automatic pistol.
• Loaded Ruger P90 45-calibre semi-automatic 
pistol.
• Loaded IMI Desert Eagle 44-calibre Remington 
Magnum semi-automatic pistol. 
• 825 grams of cocaine worth $31,200 at the 
wholesale level.
• 200 grams methamphetamine worth $5,850 at 
the wholesale level.
• 9,000 ecstasy pills worth $17,466 at the 
wholesale level.
• Small amount of marihuana.
• Small amount of Oxycodone.
• Bulletproof vest.
• $30,000 in cash in a box underneath the couch. 
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entitled to enter the apartment based on exigent 
circumstances under s. 11(7) of the CDSA. The 
judge found the police had reasonable grounds to 
believe that there was a quantity of marihuana in 
the accused’s apartment and therefore grounds to 
obtain a  search warrant. However, by reason of 
exigent circumstances it was impracticable to do 
so. The exigent circumstances resulted from the 
belief that the  accused would likely have destroyed 
the evidence while a  warrant was obtained since 
the police were not going to arrest him. The judge 
found the  delay in filing the Form 5.2 constituted a 
stand alone breach of s. 8. He nevertheless 
admitted the evidence under s. 24(2). The accused 
was convicted of nine offences: possessing illicit 
drugs x 2, possessing illicit drugs for the purpose of 
trafficking x  3 and unlawfully possessing a firearm x 
4. He was sentenced to four and a  half years in 
prison, given a 10-year mandatory firearms 
prohibition and ordered to provide a DNA sample. 
All items seized, except for the money found on his 
person, were ordered forfeited. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
convictions arguing, in part, 
that the trial judge erred in 
finding  that the entry and 
search of his apartment was justified based on 
exigent circumstances. He also suggested that the 
trial judge failed to determine the voluntariness of 
the statement he made to police about the roaches 
in his apartment before relying on these statements 
in determining the lawfulness of the police entry 
and search. 
Justice Bennett, speaking for the unanimous Court 
of Appeal, agreed with the trial judge that it was 
impracticable for the police to obtain a warrant by 
reason of exigent circumstances. As for proving the 
voluntariness of the accused’s statement, the Crown 
was not required to do so for the statement to be 
used at the voir dire. The rationale of the  common 
law confessions rule in proving voluntariness is to 
ensure  reliability and trial fairness in determining 
guilt, which does not apply where the inquiry 
relates to state (mis)conduct. Furthermore, the 
Court of Appeal was of the view that the police 
should be allowed to rely on statements to justify 
an investigation, even where such statements are 
not the product of an operating mind or are 
otherwise  involuntarily made. Finally, the judge 
made no error in his s. 24(2) analysis and the 
accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Supreme Court of Canada
The accused again 
a p p e a l e d h i s 
convictions arguing 
that the police entry 
into his apartment was not justified on the basis of 
exigent circumstances making it impracticable for 
police to obtain a  warrant. He also asserted that the 
confessions rule did apply to the statements he 
made that were used for the purpose of 
determining the reasonableness of police conduct. 
All seven Supreme Court judges hearing the case 
agreed on the exigent circumstances and 
voluntariness issue, but the Court was divided on 
the s. 24(2) Charter remedy.
Exigent Circumstances & Impracticable 
Defined
The Supreme Court rejected 
the accused’s submission 
that the definition of “exigent 
circumstances” found in s. 
529.3(2) of the Criminal 
Code (Feeney  provisions) 
defined the meaning of exigent circumstances 
found in s. 11 of of the CDSA even though they 
may be similar. After reviewing different cases 
involving exigent circumstances. Justice Brown 
stated:
“Even where exigent circumstances are present, however, they are not, on their own, 
sufficient to justify a warrantless search of a residence under s. 11(7). Those 
circumstances must render it ‘impracticable’ to obtain a warrant.”
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The common theme emerging from these 
descriptions of “exigent circumstances” in s. 
11(7) denotes not merely convenience, 
propitiousness or economy, but rather urgency, 
arising from circumstances calling 
for immediate police action to 
preserve evidence, officer safety or 
public safety. This threshold is 
affirmed by the French version of s. 
11(7), which reads “l’urgence de la 
situation”.
Even where exigent circumstances are present, 
however, they are not, on their own, sufficient 
to justify a warrantless search of a residence 
under s. 11(7). Those circumstances must 
render it “impracticable” to obtain a warrant. In 
this regard, I respectfully disagree with the 
Court of Appeal’s understanding of s. 11(7) as 
contemplating that the impracticability of 
obtaining a warrant would itself comprise 
exigent circumstances. The text of s. 11(7) (“by 
reason of exigent circumstances it would be 
impracticable to obtain [a warrant]”) makes 
clear that the impracticability of obtaining a 
warrant does not support a finding of exigent 
circumstances. It is the other way around: 
exigent circumstances must be shown to make 
it impracticable to obtain a warrant. In other 
words , “ impract icabi l i ty” , howsoever 
understood, cannot justify a warrantless search 
under s. 11(7) on the basis that it constitutes an 
exigent circumstance. Rather, exigent 
circumstances must be shown to cause 
impracticability. [paras. 33-34]
The requirement of impracticability, however, does 
not mean that it would be  impossible to obtain a 
warrant. Nor does it mean that not obtaining a 
warrant would be realistic or merely practical. 
Rather, “‘impracticability’ suggests a more stringent 
standard requiring that it is impossible in practice 
or unmanageable to obtain a warrant”:
... “[I]mpracticable” within the meaning of s. 
11(7) contemplates that the exigent nature of 
the circumstances are such that taking time to 
obtain a warrant would seriously undermine 
the objective of police action — whether it be 
preserving evidence, officer safety or public 
safety.
“‘[E]exigent circumstances’ in s. 11(7) 
denotes not merely convenience, 
propitiousness or economy, but rather 
urgency, arising from circumstances calling 
for immediate police action to preserve 
evidence, officer safety or public safety.”
“[I]n order for a warrantless entry to satisfy s. 11(7), the Crown must show that the entry 
was compelled by urgency, calling for immediate police action to preserve evidence, 
officer safety or public safety. Further, this urgency must be shown to have been such 
that taking the time to obtain a warrant would pose serious risk to those imperatives.”
        BULLET POINTS
Exigent Circumstances
“Exigent circumstances” denotes 
urgency arising from circumstances 
calling for immediate police action to 
preserve evidence, or officer or public 
safety.
• means more than convenience.
Impracticability
Taking time to obtain a warrant would 
seriously undermine the objectives of 
preserving evidence, or officer or 
public safety.
propitiousness - 
the favorable 
quality of strongly 
indicating a 
successful result. 
freedictionary.com
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In sum, I conclude that, in order for a 
warrantless entry to satisfy s. 11(7), the Crown 
must show that the entry was compelled by 
urgency, calling for immediate police action to 
preserve evidence, officer safety or public 
safety.   Further, this urgency must be shown to 
have been such that taking the time to obtain a 
warrant would pose serious risk to those 
imperatives. [paras. 36-37]
Were there Exigent Circumstances?
Having defined exigent circumstances and the 
meaning of impracticable, the Supreme Court 
found exigencies did not exist in this case such that 
obtaining a warrant was impracticable. Justice 
Brown rejected the notion that the police intention 
of only wanting to seize the  drugs and not arrest the 
accused, thereby leaving him at the apartment, 
created exigent circumstances such that the 
warrantless entry was justified:  
With respect, the prospect of the [accused] 
destroying roaches which the police officers 
hoped to seize on a “no case” basis and destroy 
themselves, with no legal consequences to the 
[accused] whatsoever, did not remotely 
approach s. 11(7)’s threshold of exigency. No 
urgency compelled immediate action in order 
to preserve evidence. Nor, just as importantly, 
did the circumstances presented by the 
[accused’s] admission to having some partially 
consumed roaches, coupled with the police 
officers’ wish to seize them on a no case basis, 
make it impracticable to obtain a warrant. 
Inconvenient or impractical, perhaps. But s. 
11(7) is not satisfied by mere inconvenience, 
but impracticability. In this case, the police had 
a practicable option: to arrest the [accused] and 
obtain a warrant to enter the residence and 
seize the roaches. If, as the Crown says, the 
situation was not serious enough to arrest and 
apply for a warrant, then it cannot have been 
serious enough to intrude into a private 
residence without a warrant. [para. 39]
As for the safety concern arising from the possibility 
of the presence of a  shotgun, the Supreme Court 
found this concern to be well-founded. However, 
this concern did not prompt the entry. Destruction 
of evidence was the basis for the entry. “In other 
words, concern for officer safety did not drive the 
decision to proceed with warrantless entry; rather, 
warrantless entry gave rise  to concern for officer 
safety,” said Justice Brown. “While [the officers’ 
concern] was well-founded, it was not the  basis for 
the decision to enter, but the result of the decision 
to enter. These facts, therefore, do not qualify as 
exigent circumstances making it impracticable to 
obtain a warrant, within the meaning of s. 11(7) of 
the CDSA.”
Voluntariness
Under the common law, a 
statement made to a person in 
authority will be admissible at 
trial (to support a finding of guilt) 
only  if the Crown proves that the 
statement was voluntary. The 
Supreme Court concluded that 
this rule does not apply to 
statements used for all purposes 
during a trial such as establishing a police officer’s 
reasonable grounds for a search during a Charter 
voir dire. Voluntariness does not apply for the 
following reasons:
1. The rationale for the confessions rule is not 
engaged by admitting a statement by an 
accused for the purpose of assessing the 
constitutionality of police action. A trial and a 
        BULLET POINT
Statement Voluntariness
Confessions rule does not apply to an 
accused’s statement adduced during a 
Charter voir dire. 
“[C]oncern for officer safety did not drive 
the decision to proceed with warrantless 
entry; rather, warrantless entry gave rise 
to concern for officer safety.”
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Charter voir dire are significantly different. A 
criminal trial focusses on guilt or innocence. A 
Charter voir dire  focusses on whether 
constitutional rights were infringed and a 
statement admitted in this context goes only to 
the police officer’s state of mind and conduct, 
and not to the  ultimate reliability  of the 
evidence in determining guilt. 
2. Other legal protections address situations 
where the police may be seen to coerce 
information from vulnerable people. For 
example, coercive or abusive police tactics 
designed to extract information involuntary 
from an accused could be scrutinized under 
ss. 7, 8 or 9 of the Charter and could be 
possibly  excluded under s. 24(2) or result in a 
stay of proceedings. 
3. If the confessions rule applied to statements 
adduced at a Charter voir dire, legitimate and 
necessary police investigative powers could 
be inhibited: 
Indeed, in some instances, application of 
the confessions rule to statements adduced 
at a Charter voir dire would lead to 
absurdities. Police officers would be 
required to positively ascertain voluntariness 
in respect of almost every person they 
encounter in responding to an emergency, 
when receiving a 911 call or at other early 
points in an investigation, where it may be 
unclear who is a suspect and who is a mere 
witness. In dynamic and emergent 
circumstances, police officers must be 
permitted, within constitutional bounds, to 
respond and investigate with dispatch. 
Taken to its logical extension, the 
[accused’s] submission would cast doubt on 
basic and uncontroversial police practices 
which are dependent upon statements made 
by suspects. I t would st i f le police 
investigations, compromise public safety 
and needlessly lengthen and complicate 
voir dire proceedings — all, it bears 
reiterating, to secure protections which ... 
our criminal procedure already affords 
accused persons. [para. 24]
Thus, the Crown was not required to prove the 
voluntariness of the accused’s statement about the 
presence of the roaches in his apartment prior to 
the statement being admitted during the Charter 
voir dire. 
Evidence Admissibility?
Although the evidence 
was highly reliable and 
essential to the Crown’s 
case such that society’s 
interest in adjudicating 
the case on its merits supported admitting the 
evidence found, the five member majority 
concluded that the evidence was inadmissible 
under s. 24(2). The Charter-infringing state conduct 
was sufficiently serious to favour exclusion. No 
urgency for the entry was demonstrated and a high 
privacy interest attaches to a person’s residence. 
Furthermore, the impact on the accused’s Charter-
protected interests was considerable and strongly 
favoured exclusion of the evidence. The intrusion 
into one’s home, with its high expectation of 
privacy, was serious. Having considered the  three 
admissibility factors separately and together, the 
five member majority concluded that the admission 
of the evidence would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. 
The accused’s appeal was allowed, his convictions 
were set aside and acquittals were entered. 
A Slightly Different View
Justices Moldaver, speaking for 
himself and Justice Gascon, 
agreed with the majority on the 
voluntariness issue and with the 
finding that the police breached s. 8 of the Charter. 
He agreed that the requirements of s. 11(7) of the 
CDSA were not satisfied such that the police  could 
enter without a warrant:
In an effort to clarify the law, I accept that s. 
11(7) of the CDSA was not available to the 
police on the facts of this case. Rather, in the 
circumstances, the police had three options 
available to them. They could have (1) tried to 
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obtain the [accused’s] lawful consent to enter 
his apartment and seize the roaches; (2) 
arrested the [accused] and obtained a warrant 
to search his apartment and seize the roaches; 
or (3) thrown up their hands and walked away, 
in dereliction of their duty to seize illicit drugs, 
even if only to catalogue and destroy them. 
[para. 73]
And further:
... I accept that the police entry into the 
apartment was unlawful. To put the matter 
succinctly, there was no immediate risk of the 
roaches being destroyed that the police could 
not have prevented without resorting to a 
warrantless entry into the [accused’s] 
a p a r t m e n t . I n o t h e r wo r d s , e x i g e n t 
circumstances did not exist. In my view, the 
word “exigent” connotes urgency — nothing 
more — and there was no genuine urgency 
here. The police could have arrested the 
[accused] and obtained a warrant to search his 
premises. While proceeding that way would 
have been inconvenient and involved an 
intrusion of some significance on the 
[accused’s] liberty interest — particularly when 
this was a “no case” seizure in which the police 
did not intend to charge the [accused] — 
inconvenience and the anticipated loss of 
liberty occasioned by it cannot convert non-
e x i g e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n t o e x i g e n t 
circumstances. As stated earlier, the police had 
three options available to them in the 
circumstances: (1) seek the [accused’s] lawful 
consent to enter the apartment and seize the 
roaches; (2) arrest the [accused] and obtain a 
search warrant; or (3) forget about the roaches 
and walk away, in dereliction of their duty to 
seize illicit drugs, even if only to catalogue and 
destroy them. [para. 87]
However, Justice Moldaver, unlike the majority, 
would have admitted the firearms and drugs as 
evidence under s. 24(2). He opined that the law 
about no case  seizures was not clear. Instead, he 
felt there was uncertainty as evidenced by the trial 
judge and three appellate court judges finding the 
police acted lawfully.  
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
EXTERNAL LEARNING 
OPPORTUNITIES
6th National Conference on Aboriginal 
Criminal Justice Post-Gladue (Co-Presented 
with Aboriginal Legal Services) 
April 29, 2017 
In Person and Webcast 
Click here.
Evidence in Criminal Investigations: The 
Latest Developments in Law and Practice      
May 17, 2017 
Online Replay
Click here.
11th National Symposium on Money 
Laundering and Financial Crimes         
May 26, 2017 
In Person and Webcast 
Click here.
Meeting the Legal Challenges of Policing in 
Canada         
September 296, 2017 
In Person and Webcast 
Click here.
October 20, 2017 - Abbotsford, BC - Click here.
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ADULT CORRECTIONAL 
STATISTICS
According to the Statistics Canada Report “Adult 
correctional statistics in Canada, 2015/ 
2016” released on March 1, 2017, on a typical 
2015/2016 day in Canada there were ...
120, 568
adult offenders
in custody or in a community program
40, 147
adults in custody
25,405
adults in provincial/
territorial custody
14,742
adults in federal custody
29,956
adults supervised in the 
federal system
14,899
adults in remand 
awaiting trial or sentencing
0
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Custody Remand only
Average daily rate of adults in custody 
per 100,000 adult (18+) population.
(includes sentenced custody, remand 
& other temporary detention)
Ra
te
86,749
adults on probation
90,087
adults under community supervision
such as probation & CSO
women
accounted for 14% of remands
Aboriginals accounted for 26% of admissions to provincial/territorial correctional services and 28% of admissions to federal custody but only represented about 3% of adult population
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BC COPS INVOLVED IN 
OFFENCES
Contained within BC’s Prosecution 
Service Annual Report for 2015/16 
there  is a section entitled “In Focus 
- Peace Officer-Involved Offences”. 
This part of the report details 
statistics where a police officer or 
other investigative officer was 
accused of committing  an offence while on or off-
duty. In fiscal year 2015/16, BC’s Criminal Justice 
Branch received 55 Reports to Crown Counsel 
(RCCs) involving an accused peace officer, up 7.8% 
from 51 in 2014/15. Of those 55 RCCs to be 
assessed by  Crown Counsel, 24.5% came from BC’s 
Independent Investigations Office (IIO). 
In 2015/16, Crown Counsel made a total of 71 
charge assessments with an accused peace officer. 
Of these, 21 were approved to court, 29 resulted in 
no charges, 19 were returned to the investigative 
agency and two resulted in alternative measures. 
In 2015/16 there were 27 cases concluded against 
peace officers. Of these, there were 18 findings of 
guilt, six (6) stays of proceeding, two (2) not guilty 
and one (1) peace bond.
Independent Investigations Office (IIO)
In the IIO’s Annual Report 2015/16, a number of 
statistics are detailed. These include the following:
• In 2015/16 the IIO referred 14 files to Crown 
Counsel for consideration of charges. Of these:
• Seven (7) involved RCMP detachments, six 
(6) involved municipal police departments 
and one (1) case involved multiple agencies 
and specialized units.
• One (1) case led to a charge - assault.
• 11 cases resulted in no charges.
• Two (2) cases were pending.
• From September 2012 to March 2016, the IIO 
had referred 50 cases to Crown Counsel. Of 
these:
• 39 cases resulted in no charges.
• Eight (8) cases were approved for charges:
• Two (2) cases were stayed.
• Two (2) cases resulted in guilty pleas.
• One (1) case resulted in an acquittal.
• Three (3) cases were pending.
• IIO charge approval rate was 16%.
Approved to Court
Alternative Measures
No Charge
Returned to Investigative Agency
27%
41%
3%
30%
Charge Decisions - Peace Officer(s) Accused - 2015/16
4%
67%
22%
7%
Not Guilty
Stayed
Guilty
Peace Bond
Findings - Peace Officer(s) Involved - 2015/16
Source: Independent Investigations Office of BC. Annual 
Report 2015-2016.Source: B.C.’s Prosecution Service. Annual Report 2015/16.
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IMPAIRED DRIVING OFFENCES:
DID YOU KNOW...
... there has been a decrease of 
approximately  85% in impaired 
driving-related Reports to Crown 
C o u n s e l ( R C C s ) r e c e ive d 
annually by BC’s Prosecution 
Service since the introduction of BC’s 
Immediate  Roadside Prohibition (IRP) 
program in 2010.
In fiscal 2015/16 there were 65 RCCs received by 
Crown Counsel for impaired driving offences 
involving bodily harm or death and 1,554 RCC’s for 
impaired driving offences not involving bodily 
harm or death. During this same period, 57 cases 
of impaired driving involving bodily harm or death 
were approved to court while  1,376 cases not 
involving bodily harm or death were approved. 
In 2015/16 there were 44 offences of bodily harm 
or death concluded in court. Thirty-five  (35) people 
were found guilty, one (1) not guilty, five (5) were 
stayed and three (3) resolved by other means. At the 
same time 1,294 offences not involving bodily 
harm or death were concluded. Of these, 1,115 
resulted in a guilty finding, 24 not guilty, 142 
stayed and 13 resolved by other means. 
ROUTINE SAFETY SEARCH 
RESULTS IN EXCLUSION OF 
EVIDENCE
R. v. Peekeekoot, 2017 SKQB 27
Police officers responded to the 
dispatch of a  robbery just before 
midnight. The victim was robbed at 
knife point and a cellphone was 
taken. The suspects were described 
as three native  males shorter than 6’2”. One was 
reportedly wearing all white, one was wearing all 
black, and one was wearing a white sweater and 
green stripes. Within a few minutes of receiving  the 
dispatch, the officers came upon a group of four 
native males approximately three blocks from 
where the robbery occurred. One male was 
wearing white track  pants with a black shirt. As the 
officers approach these males to determine if they 
had been involved in the robbery, the accused left 
the group. An officer caught up to him, grabbed 
hold of his arm, placed him in handcuffs and 
searched him for weapons. The officer found a two 
foot long machete, in a sheath, inside  the accused’s 
pants. The accused was arrested and charged with 
carrying a concealed weapon, but was later ruled 
out as a suspect in the robbery. 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
The arresting officer testified he had a 
reasonable suspicion that these 
individuals may have have been 
involved in the  robbery, but that he did 
not have enough grounds to arrest them. He said he 
placed the accused in handcuffs for safety. He also 
described that the  reason for the search as officer 
safety. He said he was searching for weapons, 
knives or needles. He testified that he searches 
anyone he  is going to place in a  police vehicle, or 
anyone put in handcuffs, on the basis of officer 
safety. 
Detention
The judge found that the  accused was detained 
when his liberty  was physically  restrained. This 
investigative detention, however, was not arbitrary.  
“A review of the complete constellation of facts 
does not require there be absolute identity between 
the information the police have and those they 
detain to complete their investigation,” said the 
judge. “While there must be sufficient comparison 
to allow the officers to have a reasonable suspicion 
based on the objective evidence that further 
investigation is required, this cannot be raised to 
the level of that necessary for an arrest.”
In all of the circumstances the judge concluded 
there  were sufficient factors to allow the officer to 
complete an investigatory detention. The police had 
a recent or ongoing criminal offence and there was 
a nexus between the accused and the crime. “A 
-85%
Source: B.C.’s Prosecution Service. Annual Report 2015/16.
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robbery had recently been committed by native 
males wearing black and white clothing,” said the 
judge “The officers, in their brief patrols, had not 
seen anybody else on the streets in the vicinity. 
There were some similarities between the group 
and the reported details. The robbery occurred only 
a few blocks from where this group was located. It 
had occurred within minutes of the officers 
observing the group on the street.”
Safety Search
As for the safety search, the Crown tried to connect 
the reported robbery  at knife point with a concern 
over officer safety. Although the judge found this 
made sense, he did not accept this proposition as 
justifying the search because that is not what the 
officer said. Rather, the officer testified that he 
completes a search with EVERY investigative 
detention. “The officer did not testify as to any 
grounds he had for concerns for his safety,” said the 
judge. “Rather, this is something he effects every 
time he engages in an investigatory detention. On 
the facts of the case before  me, there was no 
reasonable basis given for suspecting officer safety 
was in issue in this particular case. The officer did 
not testify as to this.” Since the officer did not 
sufficiently articulate his cause to conduct the 
search, it was unreasonable and breached s. 8 of 
the Charter.
Exclusion of Evidence
In excluding the machete as evidence 
under the s. 24(2) inquiry, the judge found 
the police conduct in breaching the 
Charter was serious. “It has been found the 
officer completes a search in each and 
every case where he detains someone for 
an investigatory  purpose,” said the judge. 
“He apparently does this regardless of the 
stage  of the inquiry or the nature of the 
investigation. This is not permissible on the 
authori ty of Mann . There was no 
articulable cause provided.”
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
CELLPHONE SEARCHES 
INCIDENT TO ARREST: 
A REVIEW
Recently, the Ontario Court of Appeal reviewed the 
authority to search a Blackberry or similar device as 
an incident to arrest. In R. v. Tsekouras, 2017 
ONCA 290, the accused was arrested as part of  a 
joint forces investigation into drug trafficking 
dubbed “Project Dolphin.” During his arrest, as 
police directed him to get down, the  accused took 
the battery out of his Blackberry device and threw 
the device to the ground. He was then handcuffed 
and searched incidental to arrest, as was his 
vehicle. The police seized the Blackberry he threw 
to the ground, a second Blackberry found in his 
vehicle and some cash. When a senior officer 
arrived on scene, the accused was ordered 
unconditionally released without a formal charge. 
A few months later the Blackberry  that was thrown 
to the ground was sent to a police  lab so its 
encryption could be unlocked and its contents 
searched. Messages found on the Blackberry 
became a critical part of the Crown’s case. 
An Ontario Superior Court justice rejected the 
Crown’s contention that the accused abandoned his 
privacy interest in the Blackberry when he removed 
its battery and discarded the device immediately 
before his arrest. The judge found the warrantless 
search of the  Blackberry breached s. 8 of the 
Charter but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2). 
There were other issues at trial, but in the end, the 
accused was convicted of several drug offences.
The accused appealed his convictions to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal arguing, among other 
things, that the trial judge erred in admitting the 
contents extracted from his Blackberry that was 
seized and examined without a warrant. In the 
accused’s view, a proper analysis under s. 24(2) 
should have resulted in the exclusion of the 
Blackberry evidence. Justice Watt, speaking  for a 
unanimous Appeal Court, discussed the police 
power to search cellphones as an incident to arrest 
as had been  enunciated in R. v. Fearon, 2014 SCC 
77. He reiterated the principles as follows:
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Searching Cellphones Incident To Arrest
• “A cellphone may be searched incident to 
arrest, provided what is searched and how the 
search is conducted are strictly incidental to 
the arrest and the police keep detailed notes of 
what has been searched and why.
• “The power to search incident to arrest is a 
focused power assigned to police so that they 
can pursue their investigations promptly upon 
arrest. But the authority  is not without its limits. 
The search must be truly  incidental to the 
arrest, that is to say, exercised in the pursuit of 
a valid purpose related to the proper 
administration of justice.
• “A search is properly incidental to arrest when 
the police attempt to achieve some valid 
purpose connected to the arrest, such as 
protecting evidence from destruction by the 
arrested person or others, or discovering 
evidence. If the purpose of the search is the 
discovery of evidence, there must be some 
reasonable prospect of finding evidence of the 
offence for which the accused is being 
arrested. What matters is that there be a link 
between the location and purpose of the 
search and the grounds for the arrest.
• “Some modification of the common law search 
incident to arrest power was necessary when 
the object to be searched was a cellphone or 
similar device. After all, searches of these 
devices have the potential to be a much more 
significant invasion of privacy than the typical 
search incident to arrest of pockets, purses, 
briefcases and motor vehicles. Something  more 
than the requirements of a lawful arrest and a 
search that is at once truly incidental to the 
arrest and reasonably conducted is essential to 
further protect a suspect against the risk of 
wholesale invasion of privacy.
• “Nothing short of strict adherence to the 
requirement that a  search incident to arrest be 
truly incidental to the arrest would be tolerated 
where the object to be searched was a 
cellphone or similar device. The searches must 
be done promptly to effectively  serve their 
purpose, such as the discovery  of evidence. To 
give effect to this approach, the court modified 
the general rules applicable to searches 
incident to arrest in three ways.
1. “The scope of the search. The scope of 
the search of a cellphone or similar device 
incident to arrest must be tailored to the 
purpose for which it may lawfully be 
conducted. Not only the nature, but also 
the extent of the search performed on the 
cellphone or similar device must be truly 
incidental to the particular arrest for the 
particular offence. And so it is, at least as a 
Cellphones can be searched 
as an incident to arrest.
Cellphones are treated 
differently than pockets, 
purses, briefcases & vehicles.
Police must keep detailed notes  
of what was searched & why.
Searches must be done promptly 
to effectively serve their purpose.
Generally, only recently sent or 
drafted emails, texts, photos and 
the call log may be examined. 
Cellphone searches incident to 
arrest are not routinely permitted 
to discover additional evidence.
R. v. Tsekouras, 2017 ONCA 290.
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general rule, that only recently sent or 
drafted emails, texts, photos and the call log 
may be examined. The  reason is simple: 
only  those sorts of items will have the 
necessary  degree of connectedness to the 
purposes for which prompt examination of 
the device is authorized. Investigators must 
be able  to explain, within the limited 
purposes of search incident to arrest or with 
reference to some other valid purpose, what 
they searched and why they did so. From 
this modification of the general rule  relating 
to searches incident to arrest, it necessarily 
follows that this search authority is not a 
blank cheque for investigators to forage in 
the device unbounded. For example, to 
search or download its entire contents.
2. “Searches to discover evidence. 
Cellphone searches incident to arrest are 
not routinely  permitted simply for the 
purpose of discovering additional evidence. 
A cellphone or similar device search 
incident to arrest for the  purpose of 
discovering evidence is only a valid law 
e n f o r c e m e n t o b j e c t i v e wh e n t h e 
investigation will be stymied or significantly 
hampered without the  ability to search the 
device  incident to arrest. Investigators must 
be able to explain why it was not practical, 
in all the circumstances of the investigation, 
to postpone the search until they could 
obtain a warrant.
3. “A record of the search. Officers 
executing  the search must make detailed 
notes of what they have examined on the 
device and how it was searched. The 
applications searched, the extent and time 
of the search. Its purpose and duration.
• “Police are not entitled to navigate  through 
unsettled areas of the law by following the 
least burdensome route. As a general rule, 
faced with genuine uncertainty, police should 
err on the side of caution by settling on a 
course  of action that is more, rather than less 
respectful of the accused's privacy rights.
(references omitted, paras. 85-94)
NO AUTHORITY TO ENTER 
HOME TO SEE IF PARENTS ARE 
GOOD OR BAD
R. v. Davidson, 2017 ONCA 257
A motorist called 911 after seeing  a 
four-year-old boy, clad only in a 
diaper, standing alone at a busy 
intersection at about 10:00 am in June. 
When police arrived, the boy was 
safely in his mother’s arms, wrapped in a blanket. 
The accused, the boy’s father, arrived soon after. He 
told police that his son was autistic  and had a 
tendency to wander away from the family home, 
which was 50 meters away. The accused said he 
had installed a special lock high up on the door to 
the house but that his son had managed to open it 
and get out. The police insisted on examining the 
lock, and the accused agreed they could do so. 
Although satisfied with the lock, the police then 
insisted on looking inside  the house. They claimed 
they were  entitled to check on the boy’s well-being 
by looking around the house to ensure he was safe 
and properly nourished.
Three police officers entered the house and an 
odour of marihuana was detected. The upstairs of 
the house was briefly searched. The police 
checked the kitchen cupboards and the refrigerator 
for food. Police  then went down to the basement. 
The smell of marijuana became overwhelming and 
was coming from behind a  closed and locked door. 
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When the police asked for the key, the accused 
kicked the door open, revealing numerous 
marijuana plants. He was arrested and charged 
with producing marijuana, possessing  marijuana 
and possessing  marijuana for the purpose of 
trafficking.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
At trial, a sergeant at scene conceded he 
did not believe  the life  or safety  of a 
child inside the home was in danger nor 
did he have grounds to obtain a search 
warrant for the search he wanted to conduct. The 
sergeant also admitted to a  systemic practice of 
warrantless searches of homes to check on the 
well-being of children. Further, evidence suggested 
that the  police were not only concerned about the 
boy’s safety but were also looking for drugs. 
Despite  this, the  judge found the primary 
motivation for the initial police  entry was child 
welfare and the secondary criminal law aspect 
never overtook this child protection concern. 
The judge found the child protection concern 
entitled the police to do a “protective sweep” of the 
house to “assess the degree of risk” to the young 
boy and his siblings. Thus, the initial police entry 
was lawful. However, the judge identified other 
Charter breaches. The police breached the 
accused’s rights under s. 10(b) of the Charter by 
failing to advise him of his right to counsel after he 
was effectively detained (when police smelled the 
marijuana) and before questioning him about it. As 
well, the judge found the search for and discovery 
of the marihuana without a warrant violated s. 8. 
Nevertheless, the judge ruled the evidence 
admissible  under s. 24(2) and the accused was 
convicted of producing marijuana and possessing it 
for the purpose of trafficking. He was sentenced to 
18 months in custody.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
convictions arguing, in part, 
that the judge erred in ruling 
that the initial entry by police 
did not breach s. 8 and that the evidence should 
have been excluded under s. 24(2). The Crown, on 
the other hand, submitted that the police entry was 
lawful as a protective measure and, even if it was 
not, the police had the authority to enter by virtue 
of the accused’s consent or the provisions of 
Ontario’s Child and Family Services Act (CFSA). 
Initial Entry
Justice Laskin, speaking for the  Court of Appeal, 
described the warrantless presumption of s. 8 
jurisprudence this way:
The s. 8 right to be secure against unreasonable 
searches protects a person’s expectation of 
privacy from state intrusion. Nowhere is that 
expectation of privacy higher than in one’s 
home. To enter a home, police ordinarily need 
previous authorization: a warrant. Warrantless 
entries of a home are presumed to be 
unreasonable and in breach of s. 8. [para. 20]
He then recognized there were exceptions to the 
presumed unreasonableness of warrantless entries 
into a home such as “exigent circumstances” under 
statute (eg. 529.3 of the Criminal Code) or the 
common law exception of R. v. Godoy, [1999] 1 
S.C.R. 311. Godoy recognized that “the police 
have a common law duty to protect a person’s life 
or safety and that duty may, depending on the 
circumstances, justify  a forced, warrantless entry 
into a  home.” But Justice Laskin noted that Godoy 
had narrow limits as to when the police can enter a 
person’s home without a warrant in response to a 
“The s. 8 right to be secure against unreasonable searches protects a person’s 
expectation of privacy from state intrusion. Nowhere is that expectation of privacy 
higher than in one’s home. To enter a home, police ordinarily need previous 
authorization: a warrant. Warrantless entries of a home are presumed to be 
unreasonable and in breach of s. 8.”
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911 call. “The police must reasonably believe that 
the life or safety of a person inside the home is in 
danger,” he said. “And once inside  the home, their 
authority is limited to ascertaining the reason for 
the call and providing any needed assistance. They 
do not have any further authority to search the 
home or intrude on a resident’s privacy or 
property.”
Here , howeve r, t he re we re no ex igen t 
circumstances justifying  warrantless entry. Unlike 
Godoy, where the emergency had not been 
resolved when the police arrived at the home and 
the victim was still inside, the boy in this case was 
safely in his mother’s arms when police arrived and 
was outside the home, 50 meters away. Justice 
Laskin stated:
In summary, in the case before us by the time 
the police arrived at the intersection, no exigent 
circumstances existed. There was no reason to 
believe the life or safety of any person inside 
the [accused’s] home was at risk. They could 
see for themselves that the boy was safe and 
not in any immediate danger. Moreover, after 
the police had ascertained the reason for the 
911 call, they were not entitled to search the 
Davidson house.
[...]
Godoy does not give the police sweeping 
authority to enter a home without a warrant to 
investigate whether a child’s mother and father 
are good parents. In the present case, at most 
the police were entitled to inspect the lock, 
which they could do without going inside the 
home. Godoy did not support their warrantless 
entry and the trial judge erred in holding that it 
did. [paras. 29, 32]
Consent
The accused did not consent to police entry. At 
most, he acquiesced to the police intrusion into his 
home. He was never told of his right to refuse 
police entry into the home nor did he expressly 
consent to the search. Furthermore, the accused 
was never asked to sign a form that the police 
testified they normally  use before conducting a 
consent search of a home. 
Child and Family Services Act (CFSA)
Under Ontario’s CFSA, a  police officer may enter a 
home without a warrant to bring a child to a  place 
of safety only  if the officer believes on reasonable 
and probable grounds that the child is in need of 
protection and there would be a substantial risk to 
the child’s health or safety during the time needed 
to obtain a  warrant or to bring the matter for a 
hearing. Justice Laskin concluded that, even if the 
boy was in need of protection, “there was no 
evidence of any risk, let alone a  substantial risk, to 
the boy’s health or safety if the police had taken the 
time to try  and obtain a warrant.” Moreover, the 
sergeant at the scene conceded he had no grounds 
to obtain a warrant. 
s. 24(2) Charter
Because of the trial judge’s error in finding the 
initial police entry reasonable, the Court of Appeal 
reassessed whether the marihuana was admissible 
under s. 24(2). In doing so, the Charter breaches 
were found to be at the high-end of the seriousness 
scale because:
• The police committed not one, but four 
separate breaches of the Charter; 
• The initial entry into the home was by  itself 
especially serious; 
• The police not only entered accused’s home 
without a warrant, they conceded they had no 
grounds to get a warrant. Instead, they relied 
on their misguided belief they could enter the 
home to find out whether the  boy’s parents 
were good parents;
• Ignorance of the scope of police constitutional 
authority does not amount to good faith; and
• The police admitted to a  systemic practice of 
warrantless searches of homes to check on the 
well-being of children. 
“Godoy does not give the police sweeping 
authority to enter a home without a 
warrant to investigate whether a child’s 
mother and father are good parents.”
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The impact of the breaches on the accused’s 
Charter-protected interests was also significant. It 
involved a  home which attracts a  high expectation 
of privacy and the police conduct inside the home 
by searching his cupboard and refrigerator, and 
questioning him in front of his family infringed on 
his dignity. Despite  the evidence being relevant, 
reliable  and important to the Crown’s case, the 
marihuana was excluded as its admission would 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
The accused’s appeal was allowed, his convictions 
were set aside and acquittals were entered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
RACIAL PROFILING CAN BE 
INFERRED FROM 
CIRCUMSTANCES
Elmardy v. Toronto Police Services Board, 
2017 ONSC 2074
Two police officers were driving a 
police car on a winter’s evening 
when they saw the plaintiff, a black 
man, walking in the opposite 
direction and on the opposite side of 
the street. Police had a hunch he  might be  violating 
bail and were concerned he might be carrying a 
weapon because he had his hands in his pockets. 
The police made a u-turn and pulled alongside the 
plaintiff. They questioned him but he was 
somewhat hostile. When he declined to take his 
hands out of his pockets, an interaction ensued 
during which one of the officer’s punched the 
plaintiff twice in the face. The plaintiff was knocked 
to the ground, handcuffed and was left lying on a 
wood deck covered with ice. His hands were 
exposed to the ice  for 20-25 minutes. All of his 
pockets were searched and emptied, and his wallet 
was searched. The plaintiff was carded; a field 
information report was completed. He was 
identified as being “black” and born in “Sudan.” 
The plaintiff brought an action against the Toronto 
Police Services Board (TPSB) and the officer, suing 
them for assault, battery, unlawful arrest, and for 
violating his Charter rights.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The judge concluded that the officer 
committed battery and awarded the 
plaintiff $5,000. The plaintiff had also 
been arbitrarily detained under s. 9 of 
the Charter. The judge found the police had no 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity  when the 
plaintiff was stopped and awarded him $2,000. The 
judge stated:
Here the police were engaged in a random stop 
and [the plaintiff] did not consent to speak to 
them.  He had his hands in his pockets.  But it 
was cold out and he had no gloves. The police 
had no right to detain [the plaintiff] for carding 
alone. Nor does the act of walking outside with 
one’s hands in his pockets on a cold night in 
Toronto in January near Moss Park provide a 
reasonable basis to suspect that a person is 
carrying a weapon.  There are no “objectively 
verifiable indications” supporting a subjective 
suspicion that this person might have been 
armed.  Even a pat-down ... is not justified on 
the basis of a “vague or non-existent concern 
for safety, nor can the search be premised upon 
hunches or mere intuition.”  Nor can [the 
plaintiff’s] express refusal to consent, even if 
rudely conveyed, provide a basis to detain him 
as discussed above. There was no criminal act 
being investigated. It is not crime to be rude or 
to try to keep one’s hands warm.  In my view 
the detention of [the plaintiff] in the 
circumstances that night in that place and time 
was unlawful and was a violation of his s.9 
rights under the Charter. [references omitted, 
Elmardy v. TPSB, 2015 ONSC 295, para. 103]
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As for the unlawful search of the plaintiff’s pockets, 
the judge awarded $1,000. A further $1,000 was 
awarded for breaches of ss. 10(a) and (b) because 
the police did not tell the  plaintiff why he  was 
detained or give him his rights to counsel upon 
detention. Finally, the judge awarded the plaintiff 
$18,000 in punitive damages. 
Declarations that the plaintiff’s 
rights were breached under ss. 8, 9 
and 10 of the Charter were also 
made and he was awarded costs of 
the proceeding. As for the s. 15 
Charter claim (equality  rights), the judge declined 
to find that the conduct of the officers was racially 
motivated even though he found the police stopped 
the plaintiff so he  could be carded. In the judge’s 
view, the plaintiff had not proven on a balance of 
probabilities that the actions of the  police  were 
racially motivated.
Ontario Divisional Court
The plaintiff appealed the trial 
judge’s failure  to make a 
finding that he was a  victim of 
racial profiling. As well, the 
amount of damages awarded was challenged.
Racial Profiling
Justice Sachs, speaking for the three member panel 
of the Divisional Court, agreed there was no direct 
evidence of racial profiling. However, she found 
there  was circumstantial evidence from which an 
inference could be drawn that it was more 
probable than not that the officers’ conduct was 
motivated by the fact that the plaintiff was black: 
The only reasonable inference to be drawn 
from the fact that both officers, without any 
reasonable basis, suspected the [plaintiff] of 
criminal behaviour, is that their views of the 
[plaintiff] were coloured by the fact that he was 
black and by their unconscious or conscious 
beliefs that black men have a propensity for 
criminal behaviour. This is the essence of racial 
profiling.
In this case, the officers’ unreasonable beliefs 
about the [plaintiff] caused them to assault the 
[plaintiff], unreasonably search him and 
forcibly restrain him. In other words, instead of 
presuming his innocence, they assumed and 
acted as if he were guilty and dangerous. He 
must be violating his bail and he must be 
carrying a gun. These assumptions, for which 
there is no explanation other than the colour of 
the [plaintiff’s] skin, caused them to blatantly 
and aggressively violate the [plaintiff’s] 
constitutional rights.
The trial judge found that the officers’ real 
motivation for stopping the [plaintiff] was so 
that they could “card” him by filling in 
information on a 208 card. This begs the 
question of why the officers would single the 
[plaintiff] out for “carding.”
However, the trial judge also found that the 
officers lied about why they stopped the 
[plaintiff] and “backfilled” a purpose after the 
fact. Lying about the real reason for a stop is 
another basis for drawing the inference that 
what motivated the stop was the [plaintiff’s] 
race and colour. ... [T]he inference that a police 
officer is lying about why she or he singled out 
an individual for attention is a circumstance 
that is “capable of supporting a finding that the 
stop was based on racial profiling.” Such a 
finding becomes even more compelling when, 
as here, the “lies” that the police chose to tell 
about why they stopped the individual are 
based on racial stereotypes, such as the belief 
that black men are more likely to be on bail 
and more likely to be carrying weapons. 
[references omitted, paras. 19-22]
The Divisional Court concluded that “the 
[plaintiff’s] right to equal protection and equal 
benefit of the law without discrimination based on 
race under s. 15 of the Charter was also violated.”
“[T]he officers’ unreasonable beliefs about the [plaintiff] caused them to assault the 
[plaintiff], unreasonably search him and forcibly restrain him. In other words, instead of 
presuming his innocence, they assumed and acted as if he were guilty and dangerous.”
punitive damages 
damages to 
punish and deter 
blameworthy 
conduct.
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Damages
The $5,000 genera l 
damages award for the 
ba t te ry was upheld . 
However, the  Charter 
damages were increased 
from the $4,000 awarded 
at trial to $50,000 against 
the Toronto Services 
Board. “The driving force behind the Charter 
breaches – racial profiling – is a phenomenon that 
has been recognized as a problem in our police 
services for some time,” said Justice Sachs. “Racial 
profiling has a serious impact on the credibility  and 
effectiveness of our police services. It has led to 
distrust and injustice. It must stop.” She continued:
[T]he conduct of [the officer] was both high-
handed and oppressive. The [plaintiff] was not 
only touched; he was punched in the face 
twice. The interaction lasted half an hour, much 
of which time the [plaintiff] spent on the 
ground, handcuffed, with his bare hands 
exposed to ice. The [plaintiff] was an innocent 
man who had fled his country looking for a 
society in which his rights would be respected. 
Instead of finding the respect to which he is 
entitled, he was subjected to humiliating, 
violent and oppressive behaviour from one of 
this city’s police officers, all because of the 
colour of his skin. Further, when questioned 
about their behaviour the police officers were 
found to have lied to the Court, conduct that 
can seriously undermine the administration of 
justice. 
For these reasons, there is a need for an award 
of damages that is significant enough to 
vindicate society’s interest in having a police 
service comprised of officers who do not 
brutalize its citizens because of the colour of 
their skin and that sends the message to that 
service that this conduct must stop. The courts 
and others have already made statements about 
the serious, wrongful nature of this type of 
conduct. Yet it continues to occur. Declaratory 
relief is just another such statement. More is 
required. [para. 35-36]
As for punitive damages, the award was increased 
from $18,000 at trial to $25,000 against the 
individual officer to punish and deter him for his 
misconduct. “The amount awarded should reflect 
the seriousness of that misconduct, but not be so 
large as to remove any realistic  possibility that a 
police officer ... would be able to pay those 
damages,” said the Appeal Court. “In my view, an 
award of $25,000 will accomplish these objectives. 
I appreciate  that by reason of s. 50(1) of the  Police 
Services Act ... the Toronto Police Services Board is 
also liable to pay this damage award. However, that 
fact is not determinative of the exercise  I must 
perform in assessing damages, which is to 
determine the amount that the person who is 
directly responsible for those damages should pay.”
The plaintiff’s appeal was allowed, the trial judge’s 
award for Charter and punitive damages of $27,000 
was set aside and replaced by an award of 
$75,000. The battery award of $5,000 remained 
unchanged.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
A Note on Costs
At the initial trial, the judge awarded the plaintiff 
$60,000 for the costs of bringing the action (2015 
ONSC 3710) and on appeal the Divisional Court 
awarded an additional $20,143.37 for appeal costs. 
“The driving force behind the Charter breaches – racial profiling – is a phenomenon that 
has been recognized as a problem in our police services for some time. ... Racial profiling 
has a serious impact on the credibility and effectiveness of our police services. It has led 
to distrust and injustice. It must stop.”
Total Damages
$27,000 $80,000
Trial Appeal
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“In Service: 10-8”
Sign-up Now
Are you interested in regularly receiving the In 
Service: 10-8 newsletter by email. You can sign 
up by clicking here and then clicking on the 
“Sign up” link:
This “Sign up” link will take you to the free 
Subscription Form that only requires an email. 
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Le 40e service commémoratif
annuel des policiers et agents
de la paix canadiens
Le 24 septembre 2017
Colline du Parlement
Ottawa (Ontario)
Canadian Police and
Peace Officers’ 40th Annual
Memorial Service
September 24, 2017
Parliament Hill
Ottawa, Ontario
www.thememorial.ca
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138
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8,761
NU
131
NWT
199
AB
7,312
SK
2,304
MB
2,558
ON
26,168
QC
15,869
NL
910
PEI
227
NS
1,822
NB
1,285In 2015/16 the total expenditure on policing was
$14,192,608,000
RCMP ‘HQ’ & 
Training Academy
1,089
CANADA: By the Numbers
Royal Newfoundland Constabulary
 409
Quebec Provincial Police
 5,476
Ontario Provincial Police
 6,097
Canada’s Police Officers by City - Top 10
CMA Officers % Change
Number per 100,000 2015>2016
Toronto, ON 5,366 190 -1.9%
Montreal, QC 4,583 229 -1.9%
Calgary,  AB 2,172 168 -1.1%
Peel Region,  ON 1,967 143 -0.7%
Edmonton,  AB 1,739 183 +2.2%
York Region, ON 1,598 140 +2.6%
Winnipeg, MB 1,416 197 -1.7%
Vancouver, BC 1,292 196 -0.2%
Ottawa, ON 1,239 130 -3.6%
Durham Region, ON 861 130 -1.8%
POLICING ACROSS CANADA: 
FACTS & FIGURES
According to a  recent report 
released by Statistics Canada, 
there  were 68,773 active police 
officers across Canada in 2016. 
This represented a  decrease of 
two (2) officers from the previous 
year. Ontario had the most police officers at 26,168, 
while Nunavut had the least at 131. With a national 
population of 36,286,425, Canada’s average cop per 
pop ratio was 190 police officers per 100,000 residents. 
Total population: 36,286,425
Source: Statistics Canada, Police Resources in Canada, 
2016, Catalogue no:  85-225-X, March 2017
2016
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2016 FAST FACTS
• On the snapshot day of May 15, 2016 there 
were 68,773 police officers in Canada. There 
were an additional 28,422 civilians, which 
represented 29% of all police  personnel. There 
were 2.4 officers for every civilian employed.  
• Saskatchewan had the highest provincial rate of 
police strength at 200 officers per 100,000 
residents (cop to pop ratio) followed closely by 
Manitoba at 194 officers per 100,000. The 
Northwest Territories had the  highest territorial 
cop to pop ratio at 448 officers per 100,000.
• 55% of police officers were 40 years of age or 
older. 
• 68% of OPP officers were over the age of 40.
• For municipal police services serving a 
population of 100,000 or more, Victoria B.C. 
had the highest police strength at 236 officers 
per 100,000, followed by Montreal, QC (229) 
and Halifax, NS (219).  Richmond, BC had the 
lowest police strength at 97 officers per 
100,000. 
• For 2015/2016, 86% of officers hired were 
recruits. The remainder were experienced police 
officers.
• In May 2016 there  were  14,545 female police 
officers in Canada. This represents 21% of all 
officers.
• Police expenditures continue to rise, more than 
doubling since 2000.
• Per capita costs for policing in fiscal 2015/2016 
translated to $396 per Canadian.
• Provincial police services in Ontario, Quebec 
and Newfoundland cost $2.185 billion.
• Stand alone municipal services cost $7.5 billion.
• The total operating costs for the RCMP 
amounted to $4.48 billion.
RETIREMENT
At the end of the 2015/2016, 10% of police 
officers were eligible to retire. Newfoundland and 
Labrador had the highest proportion of officers that 
could retire at 20%. Forty three percent (43%) of 
officers at RCMP Headquarters and the Training 
Academy could retire.
Top 10 Retirement Eligible      
Municipal Police Services 
Municipal Police Service Eligible to Retire %
St. John’s, NL 28.4%
Winnipeg, MB 25.4%
Codiac Region (Moncton) NB 21.8%
Victoria, BC 21.4%
Hamilton, ON 19.0%
Montreal, QC 16.3%
Levis, QC 13.1%
Kelowna, BC 12.4%
Guelph, ON 10.9%
BC Law Enforcement 
Memorial
Sunday, September 24, 2017 
at 1:00 pm 
BC Legislature
Victoria, British Columbia
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RCMP
The RCMP is Canada’s largest police 
organization. It is divided into 15 Divisions 
with Headquarters in Ottawa. Each 
division is managed by a commanding 
officer and is designated alphabetically. 
RCMP On-Strength Establishment         
as of December 1, 2016
Rank # of positions
Commissioner 1
Deputy Commissioners 6
Assistant Commissioners 28
Chief Superintendents 56
Superintendents 179
Inspectors 350
Corps Sergeant Major 1
Sergeants Major 4
Staff Sergeants Major 14
Staff Sergeants 787
Sergeants 1,925
Corporals 3,463
Constables 11,731
Special Constables 62
Civilian Members 3,902
Public Servants 6,679
Total 29,188
Source: www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/about-ausujet/organi-eng.htm
RCMP Officers by Level of Policing - Canada 2016 (numbers do not include 1,130 members at HQ & Training Academy)
Level / Region BC AB SK MN ON QC NB NS PEI NL YK NWT NU Total
Contract 5,378 2,640 1,018 797 - - 695 789 101 409 119 178 116 12,240
Federal & 
other policing
851 369 230 177 1,631 898 154 164 29 92 19 21 15 4,650
Total 6,229 3,009 1,248 974 1,631 898 849 953 130 501 138 199 131 16,890
RCMP DIVISIONS
Division Area
Depot Regina, SK (Training Academy)
National National Capital Region
B Newfoundland & Labrador
C Quebec
D Manitoba
E British Columbia
F Saskatchewan
G Northwest Territories
H Nova Scotia
J New Brunswick
K Alberta
L Prince Edward Island
M Yukon Territory
O Ontario
V Nunavut Territory
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ILLICT DRUG OVERDOSE 
DEATHS ON THE RISE
The Office of BC’s Chief Coroner has released 
statistics for illicit drug overdose deaths in the 
province from January 1, 2017 to March 31, 2017. 
In March there were  120 suspected drug overdose 
deaths. This represents a 52% increase over the 
number of deaths occurring  in March 2016. This 
amounts to about four (4) people dying every day of 
the month.
From January 1 to March 31 there were a total of 
347 illicit drug overdose deaths. This is a  56% 
increase over the same period last year.
Last year, there were 931 overdose deaths, more 
than an 80% increase over the same period in 2015 
and a 246% over 2012. Moreover, the report 
attributes fentanyl laced drugs as accounting for the 
increase in deaths. In December 2016 alone, there 
were 142 deaths. This was the highest recorded 
number of deaths occurring in a single month in 
BC and was more than double the  monthly average 
of illicit drug overdose deaths since 2015. 
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People aged 30-39 have been the hardest hit so far 
in 2017 with 103 illicit drug overdose deaths 
followed by 40-49 year-olds at 79 deaths and 
19-29 year-olds at 70 deaths. Vancouver had the 
most deaths at 100 followed by Surrey (37), Victoria 
(30), Kelowna (24) and Abbotsford (14). 
Males continue to dies at more than a 4:1 ratio 
compared to females. From January  to March 2017, 
287 males have died while there  were 60 female 
deaths.
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At	this	rate,	2017	
could	see	more	than	
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The data indicates that most (89%) illicit drug 
overdose deaths occurred inside while 10% 
occurred outside. For two (2) deaths, the location 
was unknown. 
“Private residence” includes residences, driveways, 
garages, trailer homes.
“Other residence” includes hotels, motels, rooming 
houses, shelters, etc.
“Other inside” includes facilities, occupational sites, 
public buildings and businesses.
“Outside” includes vehicles, streets, sidewalks,  parks, 
wooded areas, campgrounds and parking lots.
DEATHS SINCE PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY
In April 2016, BC’s provincial health 
officer declared a public  health 
emergency in response to the 
rise in drug overdoses and 
dea th s . The number o f 
overdose deaths in the 12 
months preceding the declaration (April 2015-
March 2016) totaled 635. The number of deaths in 
the 12 months following the declaration (April 
2016-March 2017) totaled 1,056. This is an 
increase of 66%.
TYPES OF DRUGS
The top four detected drugs relevant to illicit drug 
overdose deaths from 2015 and 2016 were 
cocaine, which was detected in 48.8% of deaths, 
f e n t a ny l ( 4 3 . 1 % ) , h e r o i n ( 3 7 . 1 % ) a n d 
methamphetamine/amphetamine (29.6%). 
From January to February 2017, fentanyl was 
detected in 61% (139) of illicit drug overdose 
deaths. This is a 90% increase in which fentanyl 
was detected in deaths occurring during the same 
period in 2016 where fentanyl was detected in 79 
deaths. 
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Many police departments are trying to message to various segments 
of the population in different ways. Above is one such messaging 
example provided by the Abbotsford Police Department as is the 
example on p. 36. (Source Abbotsford Police) 
Sources: 
-Illicit Drug Overdose Deaths in BC - January 1, 2017 to March 31, 
2017.  
-Fentanyl Detected Illicit Drug Overdose Deaths - January 1, 2012 to 
February 28, 2017. 
Ministry of Justice, Office of the Chief Coroner. April 19, 2017. 
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